Economic Anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa amid Global Geopolitical Shifts: Causes, Consequences, and the Path to Resilience

Abstract

Sub-Saharan Africa is passing through a period of profound economic transition, set against an international backdrop marked by escalating geopolitical crises, disrupted global supply chains, volatile energy and food markets, and rising inflation and living costs. Out of these upheavals has emerged what is increasingly described as economic anxiety — an interpretive concept that reaches beyond conventional economic indicators of welfare. Rather than measuring output alone, it captures how individuals and households perceive their own economic fragility, and the degree of uncertainty they feel about their capacity to meet basic needs and preserve their standard of living, now and in the future. Working from this premise, this study analyses economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa as a multidimensional phenomenon at the intersection of economic, social, and political forces — one that bears directly on social stability and sustainable development.

The study advances a central hypothesis: that economic anxiety in the region is no longer a product of poverty or low income alone, but the result of a compound interaction between inflationary pressure, volatile food and energy prices, high unemployment, an expanding informal economy, mounting debt burdens, and weak social protection — compounded by the indirect fallout of global geopolitical crises on African economies. It adopts a critical-analytical approach that examines the relationship between economic anxiety and economic and social stability, interrogates the limits of conventional policy responses, and argues that any durable solution requires a shift from crisis management to the deliberate construction of more resilient, adaptive economies.

The analysis draws on a range of indicators that together reveal the levels and drivers of economic anxiety: inflation, the cost of living, food and energy prices, unemployment, the share of informal employment, poverty rates, public debt burdens, exchange-rate volatility, public confidence in government economic management, food-security metrics, and opinion polling on how citizens perceive their own economic circumstances and future prospects. Read together, these indicators build a fuller picture of the phenomenon than headline growth figures allow.

The study also employs comparative case analysis to trace how economic anxiety manifests differently across a set of Sub-Saharan states, highlighting national particularities while distilling shared patterns, and identifying the structural and institutional factors that either aggravate or contain it. It closes with a framework of recommendations centred on strengthening social protection, improving food security, diversifying productive bases, supporting employment, and deepening African economic integration — measures intended to reduce economic anxiety, anchor economic and social stability, and strengthen the region’s capacity to withstand future geopolitical and economic shocks.

Introduction

Sub-Saharan African states are witnessing a marked rise in levels of economic anxiety, driven by the complex overlap between global economic crises and the internal challenges facing the region’s economies. Rising inflation, higher food and energy prices, eroding purchasing power, elevated unemployment, and heavier debt burdens have together deepened a sense of economic uncertainty among citizens — one that is reshaping livelihoods, confidence in the future, and social stability. Economic anxiety is no longer a simple reflection of poverty or low income; it has become an indicator of how individuals perceive present and future economic risk, and of how far they feel economically secure and able to meet their basic needs.

The issue carries growing weight in Sub-Saharan Africa, one of the world’s regions most exposed to economic, food, and climate shocks, and where many economies remain dependent on imports and international aid — a dependence that heightens their vulnerability to global crises. International opinion surveys, foremost among them Gallup’s polling, confirm that economic anxiety has become one of the region’s most pressing public concerns, eclipsing many other issues. This warrants close study of its dimensions, causes, and consequences for food security, the labour market, political and social stability, and the groups most affected — alongside an analysis of the policies capable of strengthening economic resilience.

The study begins from the observation that economic anxiety is rising among the populations of Sub-Saharan Africa amid persistent internal and external economic pressures, raising questions about the nature of the phenomenon, its causes, its repercussions across economic, social, and political life, and the policies that might contain it and build resilience.

The central research problem is captured in the following question:

How have current economic transformations contributed to rising levels of economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa; what are its principal consequences for food security, the labour market, and political and social stability; and what policies can reduce it and strengthen economic resilience?

This question gives rise to a number of subsidiary ones:

◆  What is meant by economic anxiety, and how can it be measured?

◆  What are the main factors behind the rise of economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan states?

◆  How does economic anxiety affect food security and the labour market?

◆  What is the relationship between economic anxiety and political and social stability?

◆  Which social groups are most exposed to economic anxiety?

◆  Which policies are most effective in reducing economic anxiety and building resilience?

The study accordingly aims to:

◆  Clarify the conceptual framework of economic anxiety and its indicators.

◆  Analyse the causes of rising economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa.

◆  Establish the relationship between economic anxiety and food security.

◆  Examine the impact of economic anxiety on the labour market.

◆  Analyse the repercussions of economic anxiety for political and social stability.

◆  Identify the groups most exposed to economic anxiety.

◆  Review the leading policies that support economic resilience and reduce economic anxiety.

The significance of the study lies in:

◆  Bringing into focus one of the most urgent economic and social questions facing Sub-Saharan Africa.

◆  Illuminating the relationship between economic indicators and the public’s perception of economic security.

◆  Offering decision-makers an analytical lens to help design economic policies better able to withstand crises.

◆  Enriching the Arabic-language literature on economic anxiety in the African continent.

The study relies on a descriptive, critical-comparative analytical method, supported by case studies and by the analysis of data and indicators issued by international institutions — chief among them Gallup, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Food Programme, together with other relevant international reports.

The study is organised into seven principal parts:

◆  One: The conceptual framework of economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa.

◆  Two: The causes of rising economic anxiety — an analytical reading in light of the cases of Malawi and Madagascar.

◆  Three: Economic anxiety and food security in Sub-Saharan Africa (case study: Ethiopia and Kenya).

◆  Four: Economic anxiety and the labour market — a comparative analysis of South Africa and Nigeria.

◆  Five: Economic anxiety and political and social stability (case studies: Nigeria, Ghana, and Zambia).

◆  Six: The groups most exposed to economic anxiety (case study: Niger).

◆  Seven: Policies to reduce economic anxiety and build resilience (case study: Rwanda).

◆  Conclusion: Future outlook and recommendations for strengthening economic security and reducing economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa.

One: The Conceptual Framework of Economic Anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa

Attention to economic conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer confined to growth rates, inflation, or poverty and unemployment figures. Recent economic and social scholarship has turned toward a more layered dimension — economic anxiety — understood as an indicator of how individuals and communities perceive their economic future, and of whether they feel secure or precarious in their ability to meet basic needs and sustain their standard of living within an uncertain economic environment. On this view, a country’s economic performance is measured not only by rising GDP or improving investment metrics, but by the economy’s capacity to generate a durable sense of stability and confidence among citizens — one that reinforces social cohesion and reduces the likelihood of political and security instability.

Economic anxiety is a relatively new concept in the social and economic sciences. It has developed in response to the structural transformations of the global economy in recent decades — particularly in the wake of successive global financial crises, the COVID-19 pandemic, supply-chain disruptions, and escalating geopolitical tensions that fed directly into the prices of energy, food, transport, and insurance. In this context, individuals have grown more susceptible to economic uncertainty even where their actual incomes have not fallen, because economic anxiety is tied to expectations about the future as much as to present economic conditions.

Economic anxiety should not be conflated with poverty. Poverty is an objective condition measured by quantitative indicators such as income, expenditure, or access to basic services. Economic anxiety, by contrast, is a cognitive, psychological, and social state that arises from an inability to predict one’s economic future — the fear of losing income, of diminishing purchasing power, or of rising living costs. It can therefore be present among groups not classified as poor but who nonetheless feel that their economic footing has become more precarious and that their ability to maintain their way of life is under threat from economic volatility.

Nor is economic anxiety the same as economic vulnerability. Vulnerability refers to the susceptibility of an economy or of individuals to external shocks, whereas economic anxiety reflects the psychological and social response to that vulnerability. A country may enjoy a reasonable degree of macroeconomic stability yet still register high levels of economic anxiety if citizens lack confidence in the durability of that stability, or in the capacity of public institutions to weather future crises.

In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the concept takes on exceptional importance, owing to a convergence of structural and situational factors that make economic uncertainty run deeper here than in many other regions. On one hand, most of the region’s economies depend heavily on exporting primary commodities and importing strategic goods, leaving them highly exposed to swings in global markets. On the other, they face chronic challenges: high unemployment, an expansive informal economy, weak social safety nets, and rising debt burdens — alongside the cumulative effects of climate change, armed conflict, and health crises.

The rise of economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be understood in isolation from global geopolitical shifts. International conflicts, disrupted maritime corridors, and higher transport and energy costs have intensified inflationary pressures, feeding directly into the prices of food, fuel, and basic services. As household purchasing power has eroded, the sense of economic insecurity has spread more widely — even in countries that have posted positive growth — exposing the limits of relying on conventional economic indicators to interpret social reality.

From a critical standpoint, gauging economic performance through macroeconomic indicators alone overlooks something essential: the public’s own perception of economic conditions. A higher growth rate does not necessarily translate into a better quality of life or a greater sense of economic security. Hence the need for more comprehensive approaches that combine quantitative and qualitative measures and attend to economic confidence, expectations about the future, and perceptions of economic risk — all of which shape political and social stability and a state’s ability to achieve sustainable development.

In this framing, economic anxiety is no longer merely a reflection of economic crises; it has itself become a factor shaping the social, economic, and political behaviour of individuals. It can dampen consumption, raise the propensity to save, drive migration, fuel social protest, and erode trust in public institutions. Studying the concept in the Sub-Saharan context is therefore a necessary entry point for understanding the deeper transformations underway in the region — not only economically, but also in terms of security, stability, and development.

Recent international data confirm that economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer a matter of impression but a measurable phenomenon. A Gallup survey published by Semafor in February 2026 found that economic concerns had become the foremost preoccupation of the region’s populations, ahead of fears related to terrorism or political instability. The leading sources of anxiety were high food prices, the rising cost of living, unemployment, declining purchasing power, and the difficulty of securing basic household needs.

The International Monetary Fund, in its Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa (2026), projects regional growth of around 4 per cent for the year — yet this growth is not reflected evenly in living standards, given persistent inflation, heavy debt-service burdens, weak job creation, and continued fiscal pressure across many states. World Bank data, meanwhile, show that Sub-Saharan Africa still accounts for the largest share of the world’s population living in extreme poverty: roughly 40 per cent of the region’s people subsist on less than USD 2.15 a day (the international poverty line), leaving millions of households acutely exposed to any economic shock — a spike in food or fuel prices, or the loss of a job.

On prices, many of the region’s states recorded high inflation over 2025–2026. In Nigeria, inflation exceeded 20 per cent in consecutive periods, driven by higher food and energy prices and exchange-rate reforms, while Ghana, Ethiopia, and Malawi faced inflationary pressures that weighed on purchasing power and household consumption. In the labour market, youth unemployment remains among the clearest expressions of economic anxiety: the International Labour Organization estimates that millions of young people in Sub-Saharan Africa work in the informal economy, which in many countries accounts for more than 80 per cent of total employment — meaning an absence of social protection, unstable incomes, and heightened economic fragility.

Afrobarometer findings likewise confirm that citizens across most Sub-Saharan states place job creation, lower prices, and improved economic conditions at the top of their priorities, ahead of many political concerns. This marks a shift in how threats are perceived: the economic threat now looms larger in the public consciousness than traditional security threats. Taken together, these indicators show that economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer tied to poverty rates alone but is the product of multiple interacting factors — inflation, weak incomes, rising living costs, unemployment, debt, global market volatility, supply-chain disruption, and geopolitical tension. This makes economic anxiety one of the most important indicators of economic and social fragility on the continent, and a key determinant of political and security stability in the years ahead.

Two: The Causes of Rising Economic Anxiety — Malawi and Madagascar

Economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer a passing response to market swings or price spikes; it has become a structural phenomenon reflecting the fragility of economic and social foundations across many of the region’s states. The overlap between external shocks and internal imbalances has weakened governments’ capacity to secure economic stability at a time when the cost-of-living pressures on citizens have risen to unprecedented levels. Economic anxiety, then, is not tied to falling incomes alone; it takes the form of deep uncertainty about the future — the fear of no longer being able to secure basic needs, and the dread of a continued decline in living standards.

Global geopolitical shifts, supply-chain disruption, higher food and energy prices, and the fallout from climate change have all deepened the phenomenon within Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet their impact has not been uniform. It has bitten hardest in fragile economies already burdened by weak productive diversification, heavy import dependence, high poverty, and thin foreign-currency reserves.

Malawi and Madagascar stand out as clear illustrations of this pattern of economic fragility. Their experience shows that economic anxiety is not the product of a single crisis but the cumulative result of structural weaknesses interacting with external shocks to produce a persistent state of economic and social instability.

Among the foremost drivers of rising economic anxiety is the sharp increase in inflation — particularly food-price inflation, which falls most heavily on low-income households. Across most of Sub-Saharan Africa, food commands a high share of household spending, so any rise in food prices feeds directly into social welfare. Weak domestic agricultural output and reliance on imported fertiliser and fuel leave these economies still more exposed to global market volatility.

Linked to this is the chronic shortage of foreign currency, now among the most serious constraints on economic activity in many African states. It makes it harder to import fuel, raw materials, medicines, and essential goods; weakens the private sector’s ability to produce and expand; and disrupts markets and pushes prices up — deepening citizens’ sense of economic insecurity. Fiscal imbalances and high public debt add further to economic anxiety, as governments are forced to channel a large share of their resources into debt service rather than investment in education, health, infrastructure, and social protection. The result is a decline in the quality of public services, rising poverty, and greater economic uncertainty.

Nor can climate change be overlooked as one of the most important explanatory factors. Drought, flooding, and cyclones are no longer exceptional events but recurrent shocks that undermine agricultural production, cut rural incomes, and worsen food insecurity — especially in economies where most people depend on traditional agriculture.

Malawi is a model of an economy in which internal and external crises interact simultaneously. It depends heavily on agriculture, notably tobacco and tea exports, which makes it highly sensitive to climatic fluctuations and global prices. Successive droughts, Cyclone Freddy, and then the effects of El Niño reduced agricultural output at a time when the country faced an acute shortage of foreign currency, making it difficult to import fuel, fertiliser, and industrial inputs.

The economic indicators reveal the scale of the pressures. In Malawi, average inflation reached 28.4 per cent in 2025 — among the highest in the region — while economic growth did not exceed 1.9 per cent, below the population growth rate of around 2.6 per cent. This meant a continued decline in per capita income for the fourth consecutive year. World Bank estimates suggest that 76.6 per cent of the population may live below the poverty line in 2026, while foreign-currency reserves remained below one month of imports, with the value of imports nearly three times that of exports — reflecting acute fragility in the balance of payments.

The consequences were higher production costs, weaker industrial activity, and intensified inflationary pressure, making Malawi one of the highest-inflation economies in Africa. The impact was not confined to macroeconomic indicators; it reached into daily life, as purchasing power fell markedly, food insecurity rose, and households became more exposed to poverty and precarity. The private sector, too, faced a difficult operating environment — high financing costs, difficulty obtaining foreign currency, and exchange-rate instability — which curbed investment and hiring.

In Madagascar, the economy recorded growth of around 3 per cent in 2025, yet this was not enough to improve living standards in any tangible way. Inflation ran at roughly 8 per cent, and the current-account deficit widened to 6.6 per cent of GDP as export earnings fell and imports rose, while poverty was estimated at some 66.5 per cent of the population — evidence of enduring social and economic fragility despite relative improvement in certain macro indicators.

Madagascar illustrates a different pattern of economic anxiety, rooted in the interplay of chronic poverty, climate change, and a weak economic base. Despite moderate growth, most of the population felt no direct benefit from it, given limited job opportunities and high poverty. Recurrent cyclones and floods inflicted heavy losses on agriculture and damaged food production and infrastructure, while rising import prices added to inflationary pressure. Traditional exports such as vanilla and nickel could not offset the fall in external revenues amid volatile global prices, widening the trade deficit and sustaining pressure on the national economy. These indicators show that growth alone cannot reduce economic anxiety unless it is paired with rising real incomes, expanded employment, and stronger social protection.

The comparison between the two countries makes clear that economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa is not the product of a shortage of resources, but a reflection of weak institutional capacity to manage economic risk and of limited resilience to external shocks. Addressing it therefore requires policies that go beyond short-term fixes to encompass diversifying the productive base, strengthening food security, improving public-finance management, increasing infrastructure investment, and developing social safety nets — measures that reduce economic fragility and bolster citizens’ confidence in their economic future.

Three: Economic Anxiety and Food Security — Ethiopia and Kenya

Food security is among the dimensions most closely bound up with economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa. The food crisis is no longer confined to shortfalls in agricultural production or limited natural resources; it has become a direct reflection of the entanglement of geopolitical, economic, climatic, and financial crises in the international system. Higher food prices, volatile energy costs, supply-chain disruption, rising maritime freight costs, and depreciating local currencies have together reshaped patterns of consumption and production within African economies, and heightened the sense of uncertainty over whether basic needs can be met. Food security has thus become one of the most important determinants of economic anxiety — not only at the household level, but at the level of state stability and social cohesion.

This dimension carries particular weight in Sub-Saharan Africa, where most countries depend, to varying degrees, on imports of grain, oils, fertiliser, and fuel — leaving them more exposed to external shocks than more diversified economies. A rise in global oil prices feeds directly into transport and agricultural-production costs; higher fertiliser prices depress agricultural productivity; and disruptions to maritime trade delay food imports and drive up their prices in local markets. The result is an interlocking cycle: rising production costs, then higher prices for basic goods, then eroding household purchasing power, and finally a widening of economic anxiety and a loss of confidence in the economic future.

Food security should not be seen as an agricultural question alone, but as one of the pillars of comprehensive economic security. Countries unable to guarantee an affordable flow of food become more vulnerable to market disruption, rising poverty, an expanding informal economy, and mounting social protest and internal and external migration. In recent scholarship, food security has accordingly become a central element in building economic resilience to external shocks, rather than a mere measure of agricultural sufficiency.

The African experience shows that the relationship between economic anxiety and food security is reciprocal: the higher the level of economic anxiety, the lower a household’s ability to access adequate food; and the deeper the food crisis, the greater the sense of economic insecurity. This relationship is starkest in rural and semi-arid areas that depend on rain-fed agriculture and pastoralism, where drought, flooding, or armed conflict can strip away sources of income and food at once — turning climate crises into compound economic and social ones.

Global geopolitical crises have deepened this fragility further. Disrupted international trade and higher shipping and marine-insurance costs have raised the prices of imported food, while volatility in energy markets has pushed up the cost of running agricultural production, transport, and storage. The impact of these shocks is no longer temporary; it now reaches into the very structure of the economy — through higher food inflation, declining agricultural investment, and a widening food-security gap between urban and rural areas.

Ethiopia is among the clearest cases of the link between economic anxiety and food security. Despite notable progress on some agricultural-development indicators over the past two decades, the overlap of internal conflict with waves of drought, inflation, and high food prices has worsened food security. World Food Programme data indicate that some 10.2 million people faced acute food insecurity during 2025, while food assistance was planned for 6.8 million, with an urgent need for additional funding to sustain relief programmes. Malnutrition among children under five exceeded emergency thresholds in many areas — a reflection of the food system’s fragility in the face of economic and climatic shocks.

In Kenya, despite a comparatively more diversified economy, the arid and semi-arid regions still suffer high levels of food insecurity. Estimates indicate that more than 2.1 million people in these areas faced critical food insecurity during 2025, amid a roughly 15 per cent rise in maize prices year-on-year, driven by the combined effects of drought, rising living costs, and disrupted agricultural markets. This translated into heightened economic anxiety among households, particularly among pastoral communities that depend almost entirely on volatile natural resources.

The comparison between Ethiopia and Kenya shows that economic anxiety is not a function of growth alone, but of a state’s capacity to absorb external shocks, diversify food sources, and build effective social safety nets. Where the Ethiopian crisis centres on the intersection of conflict, drought, and inflation, the Kenyan case is defined by the fragility of arid regions in the face of climate change and rising prices — confirming that the crisis follows different paths yet yields similar social and economic outcomes.

On this basis, addressing economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa requires a shift from emergency-response policies to policies that build economic and food resilience — diversifying import sources, strengthening domestic agricultural production, investing in storage and transport infrastructure, developing early-warning systems, and expanding social protection for the most vulnerable. Food security is no longer a sectoral concern of agriculture alone; it has become a foundational pillar of economic security, political stability, and sustainable development, and one of the most important measures of African states’ ability to withstand global geopolitical crises and stem the rise of economic anxiety among their citizens.

Four: Economic Anxiety and the Labour Market — South Africa and Nigeria

Economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer tied only to low incomes or high poverty; it is increasingly bound up with the state of the labour market and its structural imbalances — high unemployment, an expanding informal economy, deteriorating job quality, and the inability of national economies to absorb rapid population growth, particularly among young people. In this sense, the labour market has become one of the most important indicators of economic and social stability. The loss of a job, or weak income, does not only affect living standards; it generates economic uncertainty, dampens confidence in the future, and erodes the sense of economic security — what recent scholarship terms economic anxiety. This anxiety intensifies in countries with chronic structural imbalances, as in many Sub-Saharan states, where economic crises intertwine with demographic pressures, political challenges, weak investment, and declining productivity.

South Africa is a clear example of this dilemma. Despite having the most industrialised economy on the continent, it suffers one of the highest unemployment rates in the world. According to Statistics South Africa, the official unemployment rate stood at around 32.9 per cent in 2025, while youth unemployment exceeded 45 per cent for the 15–34 age group, reaching more than 60 per cent in some younger cohorts. These figures reflect a deep structural imbalance: the economy cannot generate jobs commensurate with the number of new entrants to the labour market, compounded by weak growth in recent years, high production costs, and a persistent electricity crisis of chronic power cuts that has hit industrial output and both domestic and foreign investment directly.

The problem in South Africa is not confined to high unemployment; it extends to a widening gap in income distribution. The country remains among the most unequal in the world, with a Gini coefficient of around 0.63 — one of the highest globally. This inequality deepens the sense of economic deprivation even among those with jobs, given low purchasing power and high living costs. In recent years, sharp rises in food and energy prices have eroded households’ real incomes and their ability to meet basic needs, feeding a rise in social protest and a widening circle of public discontent.

Critically, the South African experience shows that possessing a large, relatively advanced economy does not by itself guarantee citizens’ economic security, absent effective policies to tackle unemployment and improve job quality. Successive governments focused on macroeconomic stability, while labour-market reforms remained slow; social policies, important though they were in reducing poverty, failed to address the structural drivers of unemployment — chief among them weak productive investment, dysfunction in education and vocational training, and a mismatch between graduates’ skills and labour-market needs. Economic anxiety in South Africa is therefore not the product of a passing crisis but reflects an extended structural crisis that demands a reworking of the relationship between growth and employment, so as to deliver growth that is more inclusive and equitable.

Nigeria, by contrast, presents a different model, one in which the labour-market crisis is bound up with the features of a rentier economy, heavy dependence on oil revenues, and rapid population growth. Although Nigeria has the largest economy in Africa by GDP, this economic scale has not translated directly into employment or living standards. World Bank estimates indicate that poverty rates remain high, while most of the population works in the informal economy, which absorbs more than 90 per cent of the labour force — meaning that the majority of workers lack social protection, job stability, health insurance, and basic labour rights.

Recent economic reforms — notably the removal of fuel subsidies and the liberalisation of the exchange rate — pushed inflation sharply higher, exceeding 30 per cent annually in 2025, with food-price inflation running higher still. This depressed household purchasing power and widened the sense of economic strain. Although these reforms were intended to improve macroeconomic efficiency, their social effects were considerable, particularly in the absence of adequate safety nets to cushion the hardest-hit groups.

Critically, the Nigerian case reveals a clear economic paradox: the state possesses vast natural resources, yet continued dependence on oil, weak industrialisation, and declining investment in productive sectors have limited the creation of sustainable jobs. The scale of the informal economy reflects the failure of economic policy to bring the workforce into the formal sector — which in turn constrains the state’s ability to raise productivity, broaden the tax base, and improve social protection. Economic anxiety in Nigeria is therefore tied not only to high prices or unemployment, but also to weak confidence in the economy’s capacity to offer stable livelihoods to new generations.

The comparison between South Africa and Nigeria shows that economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa takes multiple forms, depending on the features of each economy. In South Africa, the principal challenge is structural unemployment despite relative industrial development; in Nigeria, it is the dominance of the informal economy, high inflation, and weak diversification. The common denominator is that labour-market imbalances have become a primary source of economic uncertainty, with damaging effects on social and political stability. Addressing economic anxiety in the region therefore cannot rest on achieving high growth alone; it requires comprehensive development policies focused on creating decent work, developing skills, strengthening social protection, and achieving economic diversification — so that growth ceases to be an abstract statistic and becomes a genuine instrument for improving quality of life and reinforcing citizens’ economic security.

The quantitative indicators lay bare the depth of South Africa’s labour-market crisis. The official unemployment rate reached 32.9 per cent in 2025, while the expanded rate — which includes discouraged job-seekers who have stopped looking — rose to around 43.1 per cent. Youth unemployment is the sharpest challenge, exceeding 45 per cent for the 15–34 age group and reaching some 62 per cent for those aged 15–24. Labour-force participation does not exceed 60 per cent, while the Gini coefficient of around 0.63 marks one of the highest levels of inequality in the world. Annual inflation ran at close to 4.5 per cent, with food-price inflation higher in some months, amid continued sluggish growth of about 0.6 per cent in 2024 — a rate insufficient to absorb new labour-market entrants or reduce unemployment meaningfully.

Nigeria’s indicators likewise reflect rising economic anxiety. More than 90 per cent of the labour force works in the informal sector, while some 38.9 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line, according to World Bank estimates. Annual inflation exceeded 33 per cent in 2025, with food inflation surpassing 40 per cent in some periods, sharply eroding household purchasing power. Exchange-rate liberalisation contributed to a depreciation of the local currency of more than 60 per cent against pre-reform levels, while population growth of around 2.4 per cent a year continues to outpace economic growth of no more than 3.4 per cent — meaning that growth neither keeps up with the rising population nor generates enough jobs. Official estimates put youth unemployment at around 8.6 per cent under the new statistical methodology, but the scale of underemployment and informal work makes labour-market fragility far greater than conventional unemployment figures alone suggest.

Five: Economic Anxiety and Political and Social Stability — Nigeria, Ghana, and Zambia

Economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer merely a reflection of deteriorating macroeconomic indicators; it has become a central explanatory variable for understanding the political and social transformations underway in the region. Recent shifts show that citizens judge government performance less by announced growth rates than by their day-to-day ability to put food on the table, pay housing costs, find work, and cope with a relentlessly rising cost of living. Economic anxiety is thus no longer a psychological or social concept alone; it has become a composite indicator of confidence in the national economy, of the state’s capacity to fulfil its developmental role, and of public satisfaction with policy.

Gallup’s 2026 global survey found that the economy had become the foremost public concern in most countries of the world, while Sub-Saharan Africa emerged among the regions whose populations expressed the greatest anxiety about affording food, housing, and basic needs — evidence that the crisis has moved from the macroeconomic sphere into the everyday lived experience of individuals. These findings align with Afrobarometer’s 2026 report, which showed that 59 per cent of Africans described economic conditions in their countries as “bad” or “very bad,” that 51 per cent believed conditions had deteriorated over the previous year, and that 58 per cent felt their countries were heading in the wrong direction. Some 49 per cent described their own living conditions as poor, while governments received negative assessments for controlling prices (82 per cent), creating jobs (76 per cent), and improving living standards (73 per cent).

These indicators show that economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer tied only to low income or high poverty, but is increasingly linked to declining confidence in the ability of public institutions to manage the economy — opening the way to new patterns of political and social behaviour: mass protest, eroding institutional trust, a growing propensity to migrate, and even a heightened susceptibility among some groups to enter the informal economy or, in fragile settings, criminal networks and armed groups.

The phenomenon cannot be explained in isolation from the international geopolitical environment. Disrupted energy markets, higher food and fertiliser prices, declining development aid, and rising external borrowing costs have multiplied the pressures on African economies. According to the IMF, Sub-Saharan Africa’s economy — which grew by an estimated 4.5 per cent in 2025 — is expected to slow to 4.3 per cent in 2026, owing to higher fuel, fertiliser, and food prices, alongside persistent inflationary pressure and declining external aid, all of which deepen social fragility and the sense of economic anxiety.

Nigeria is a clear illustration of the complex relationship between economic reform and rising social anxiety. Since implementing sweeping reforms — foremost the removal of fuel subsidies and the restructuring of the currency market — the economy has faced inflationary pressures that fed directly into the prices of basic goods, transport, and services, eroding the purchasing power of large segments of the population. Afrobarometer data show that 85 per cent of Nigerians oppose the removal of fuel subsidies, revealing the gap between the goals of economic reform and citizens’ perception of its direct impact on their daily lives.

The matter does not stop at economic indicators; it reaches into the political sphere. Falling purchasing power and rising living costs erode confidence in government policy, raise the likelihood of social protest, and increase pressure on decision-makers. Critically, the problem lies not in economic reform itself, but in the absence of social safety nets able to absorb its short-term effects — turning reform from an instrument of stability into a new source of public anxiety.

Persistent high inflation in Nigeria, well above the official monetary-policy targets, reflects the limits of monetary tools alone in addressing a crisis fuelled by high food and energy prices and a weak currency. The Afrobarometer 2026 report found that 59 per cent of citizens across 38 African countries described their national economic situation as “bad” or “very bad,” 58 per cent felt their countries were heading in the wrong direction, and 49 per cent said their own living conditions were poor. Some 82 per cent judged their governments to have failed at controlling prices, 76 per cent at providing jobs, and 73 per cent at improving the living standards of the poor — evidence that economic anxiety has turned into a crisis of confidence in government performance more than a mere crisis of income or inflation.

What emerges is that it is not simply high inflation that matters, but the widening gap between economic reform and citizens’ capacity to make ends meet. The removal of fuel subsidies and exchange-rate liberalisation raised the costs of transport, food, and services, and citizens came to judge reform through the food basket rather than through growth metrics. Opinion polls indicate that the rising cost of living and unemployment rank as citizens’ foremost priorities, reflected in declining confidence in the government’s ability to manage the economy. The case shows that the success of economic reform depends on the presence of effective social safety nets — without which reform becomes a source of social pressure and instability.

Ghana presents a different model. In recent years the economy came under pressure from currency depreciation, rising public debt, and a return to an IMF programme. Although some macro indicators improved, the improvement did not translate quickly into living standards. The economic crisis became a central theme of public debate and elections — showing that persistent cost-of-living pressures reshape voting behaviour and affect governments’ legitimacy. The paradox here is that macroeconomic recovery does not necessarily mean reduced economic anxiety among citizens if inflation and unemployment remain high.

Zambia reveals an important paradox in the relationship between economic indicators and public sentiment. Despite improvement in some metrics tied to debt restructuring and economic stabilisation, Afrobarometer data showed that 66 per cent of Zambians believed their country was heading in the wrong direction, while 73 per cent described the economic situation as bad or very bad, with the rising cost of living topping citizens’ list of priorities, ahead of all other economic and social concerns. This indicates that citizens measure economic performance by their ability to meet daily needs, not merely by improvement in headline financial indicators.

The comparison between Nigeria, Ghana, and Zambia shows that economic anxiety is tied not to national income or growth alone, but to the degree to which the fruits of growth reach citizens’ daily lives. In all three cases, the economic contexts differed, yet the outcome was similar: rising living costs, declining purchasing power, and a growing sense of economic uncertainty. This confirms that political stability in Sub-Saharan Africa has become contingent on governments’ ability to manage the everyday economy of livelihoods — not merely to post positive macroeconomic indicators.

Continent-wide indicators confirm that economic anxiety has become a structural phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa. Afrobarometer data showed that 35 per cent of working-age adults reported being unemployed and looking for work; 79 per cent said they or a household member had gone without a cash income during the previous year; 58 per cent had gone without food; 65 per cent had faced difficulty obtaining medical care; and 47 per cent had had to seek financial help from family members. These indicators show that economic anxiety is no longer a passing response to global crises but a composite measure of economic and social fragility, with direct implications for trust in institutions, political stability, and social cohesion across Sub-Saharan Africa.

Six: The Groups Most Exposed to Economic Anxiety — Niger

Economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer a phenomenon tied to falling macroeconomic indicators alone; it has become a composite measure of how individuals perceive their economic security and their ability to meet basic needs amid mounting cost-of-living pressures. The concept carries growing weight in contemporary economic and social scholarship precisely because it gauges the sense of uncertainty about the economic future — not only levels of poverty or unemployment. Recent polling shows that economic issues, foremost the rising cost of living, food, and jobs, have become the primary concern of Sub-Saharan populations, ahead of many political and security concerns — reflecting the migration of anxiety from the economic sphere into the social and political.

This anxiety is not distributed evenly across society; it falls unequally, with women, young people, rural populations, and low-income households facing higher levels of economic fragility. This is owed to the convergence of structural factors: limited access to decent work, an expanding informal economy, weak social safety nets, high inflation, and unequal access to education, finance, and basic services. Analysing economic anxiety therefore requires moving from a reading of general economic indicators to a study of the social groups most exposed to risk.

Women are among the groups most exposed to economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa. Gallup surveys found that women in a number of the region’s countries expressed higher levels of economic anxiety than men — linked to weak economic participation, a wide income gap, and the disproportionate burden women bear in managing household spending and securing food, healthcare, and education amid rising prices. This gap is also evident in financial-inclusion metrics: World Bank data show that women’s ownership of financial accounts or digital financial services still lags men’s in Sub-Saharan Africa, at around 52 per cent for women against 64 per cent for men — limiting women’s ability to save, access finance, and manage economic shocks. Women’s limited economic independence is compounded by high rates of informal work, weak social protection, and their concentration in low-productivity activities, so that any rise in food or energy prices weighs more heavily on households that depend on their incomes.

Young people are the group most sensitive to economic volatility — not only because of unemployment, but because of the widening gap between growth and job creation. Even where some Sub-Saharan economies post positive growth, that growth does not necessarily translate into expanded employment or higher incomes, feeding a growing sense of economic frustration among the young, especially amid rapid population growth and an expanding labour force. The World Bank has warned that the region will see the largest global expansion of its working-age population in the coming decades, making the provision of productive jobs a precondition for economic and social stability.

Rural populations take on a particular dimension in the analysis of economic anxiety, given their dependence on traditional agriculture, which is directly affected by climate change, price volatility, and weak infrastructure. Limited access to markets, banking services, roads, and energy depresses agricultural productivity and heightens the fragility of rural incomes. The effect is felt not only in lower living standards but in intensified internal and external migration, greater reliance on informal activity, and a widening rural–urban development gap.

Low-income groups are foremost among those harmed by inflation and rising living costs, since they spend the largest share of their income on food and energy — so any price rise cuts directly into their purchasing power. Weak savings and the absence of economic-insurance tools leave these groups less able to absorb shocks, whether from global crises, climate disasters, or political upheaval.

Niger stands out as a case that captures the convergence of these factors. It is one of the lowest-income economies in the world, with GDP per capita of around USD 735, while 60.5 per cent of the population lives below the international poverty line of USD 3 a day (2021 purchasing-power parity). Inflation reached 9.1 per cent in 2024, adding to cost-of-living pressures despite the economy posting high growth driven by the oil sector.

The Nigerien experience reveals an important paradox: high growth does not necessarily mean lower economic anxiety. The World Bank noted that Niger’s economy grew on the back of rising oil exports, yet the country still faces elevated risks related to poverty, fragility, debt, and dependence on agriculture — with nearly three million people in need of humanitarian assistance and some 984,000 displaced persons and refugees by the end of 2025. These indicators bear down hardest on women and young people in rural areas, where illiteracy is higher, productive employment is scarcer, and access to basic services and finance is weaker. Continued rapid population growth adds to the pressure on the labour market and public resources, and compounds the likelihood that economic anxiety will persist as a structural condition, not merely one tied to passing crises.

Critically, focusing on growth rates or average incomes is insufficient to grasp the nature of fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa, because such indicators can conceal wide social and regional disparities. Economic anxiety is generated by individuals’ perception of the risk of losing income, of being unable to meet basic needs, or of uncertainty about the future — dimensions that macro indicators alone cannot capture. Public policy is therefore called upon to shift from a focus on achieving growth to strengthening the quality and equity of that growth: expanding social protection, empowering women economically, creating jobs for the young, investing in rural development, and improving access to finance and basic services — measures that narrow social gaps and build resilience to recurrent economic shocks.

Seven: Policies to Reduce Economic Anxiety and Build Resilience — Rwanda

In recent years, Sub-Saharan Africa has seen a marked change in the nature of the challenges it faces. Economic crises are no longer simply a reflection of internal factors such as weak productivity or limited financial resources; they have become the product of a complex interaction between global geopolitical shocks, disruptions to international trade, volatile energy and food markets, climate change, and declining flows of development aid. This reality has produced what may be called economic anxiety — a collective condition that transcends conventional economic indicators to shape citizens’ perceptions of their economic future and their ability to secure basic needs. Strengthening growth is therefore no longer a sufficient goal; building economic resilience has become a strategic necessity, requiring policies capable of absorbing shocks, adapting to them, and restoring the development path as quickly as possible.

This orientation is all the more important given the IMF’s forecast that growth in Sub-Saharan African economies will slow to 4.3 per cent in 2026, from 4.5 per cent in 2025, owing to higher fuel, fertiliser, and food prices, declining external aid, and continued uncertainty in the global economy. The Fund also estimates that a 20 per cent rise in global food prices could push more than 20 million additional people in the region into moderate or severe food insecurity — a measure of the economic and social fragility of many of its states.

In this context, social protection is the first pillar of building economic resilience. It is no longer merely a tool for income redistribution but a proactive instrument for mitigating the effects of economic shocks and shielding the most vulnerable. The wider the safety net, the less able crises are to escalate into social or political unrest. Yet many Sub-Saharan states still suffer from limited coverage and weak financing, making it necessary to develop more targeted programmes built on digital databases and smart cash-transfer systems that ensure support reaches those who need it more efficiently and equitably. It is also essential to move from short-term relief to developmental policies that strengthen human capital — through investment in education, health, and social insurance — as instruments for raising productivity and long-term stability.

Food security is the second pillar of any strategy to reduce economic anxiety, since it is directly bound up with individuals’ perception of the stability of their circumstances. Heavy dependence on imported grain and fertiliser leaves the region’s economies highly sensitive to global market swings and supply-chain disruption. Successive rises in energy and fertiliser prices have raised agricultural-production costs, feeding into food prices and inflation and widening food fragility across many states. Building more resilient food systems therefore requires greater investment in climate-smart agriculture, improved agricultural value chains, better storage and transport facilities, reduced food loss, and greater domestic fertiliser production to cut import dependence — raising African economies’ capacity to withstand external shocks. Investment in agricultural technology and modern irrigation has likewise become essential to safeguarding food security amid intensifying climate impacts.

Job creation is the third pillar, and one of the most important strategic entry points for reducing economic anxiety, given Sub-Saharan Africa’s youthful demographic structure. The continent is projected to have the largest young workforce in the world by 2050 — yet this demographic shift could turn from a development opportunity into a source of economic and social pressure if national economies cannot absorb the rising numbers entering the labour market. World Bank estimates indicate that the region needs roughly 15 million new jobs each year to absorb new entrants, while the formal sector remains unable to provide them, driving an expanding informal economy, higher disguised unemployment, and greater internal and external migration. Employment policy should therefore not stop at creating conventional jobs but move toward developing high-value-added productive sectors — manufacturing, modern agriculture, digital services, and the green economy — to deliver more inclusive and sustainable growth. Education and vocational-training policies must also be linked to labour-market needs, to narrow the widening gap between educational output and the skills the digital economy demands.

Within this framework, small and medium-sized enterprises stand out as among the most important drivers of growth, innovation, and job creation. World Bank data show that the sector accounts for around 90 per cent of firms worldwide and provides close to 70 per cent of jobs in many developing economies — yet small enterprises in Africa still face structural challenges: difficulty accessing finance, weak infrastructure, high costs of doing business, and limited access to regional and international markets. Strengthening the sector’s contribution requires reforming the legislative environment, expanding microfinance, encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship, and establishing business incubators and accelerators, alongside deploying financial technology to broaden financial inclusion, especially in rural and remote areas. The impact of such policies extends beyond higher output and income to reducing the sense of economic uncertainty and reinforcing individuals’ confidence in their ability to improve their circumstances.

African economic integration is among the most important institutional mechanisms for building resilience to external shocks. The higher the level of intra-African trade, the lower the dependence on external markets and the greater national economies’ ability to absorb disruptions to global trade. Despite the entry into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area, intra-African trade still represents only about 15 per cent of the continent’s total trade, compared with more than 60 per cent in Europe and around 50 per cent in Asia — a measure of persistently weak economic interconnection within the continent. Realising the free-trade area’s strategic objectives requires investment in cross-border infrastructure, simplified customs procedures, and the linking of transport, rail, and port networks, so as to lower trade costs and raise the competitiveness of African products. Economic integration should be seen as an instrument for strengthening economic security, not merely a framework for facilitating trade, since it widens markets, reduces the risks of dependence on external partners in times of crisis, and strengthens the continent’s economic-policy autonomy.

Digital transformation and the green economy are among the most important future paths for building resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa. Digital transformation is no longer a mere technical upgrade but a foundation for restructuring national economies and raising their capacity to withstand crises. The COVID-19 pandemic, and the geopolitical disruptions that followed, showed that economies more reliant on digital services and smart technologies were better able to maintain economic activity and service continuity. International Telecommunication Union data indicate that internet usage in Africa reached around 38 per cent in 2024 — the lowest of any world region — reflecting a persistent digital divide and the constraints it imposes on growth, productivity, and innovation. The World Bank, by contrast, estimates that digital transformation could add tens of billions of dollars to the continent’s GDP over the coming decade if paired with investment in digital infrastructure, skills development, and expanded digital financial inclusion. The green economy is no less important: Africa holds significant potential in solar and wind power, green hydrogen, and the strategic minerals essential to the global clean-energy transition — an opportunity to shift from an economy based on exporting raw materials to one built on value addition and industrial innovation.

In the same vein, escalating external shocks make it necessary to build the capacity to withstand crises (economic resilience) as a permanent economic policy, not a temporary response. Economies that depend on a narrow range of export commodities, or on food and energy imports, remain more exposed to global volatility. IMF data indicate that a number of Sub-Saharan economies still face high public debt, alongside the limited fiscal space needed to finance social protection and infrastructure investment — which reduces governments’ ability to intervene quickly when crises strike. Economic policy should therefore move toward diversifying the productive base, establishing strategic reserves of essential goods, and developing early-warning systems to monitor economic risk, while deepening domestic capital markets and strengthening financial integration among African states. It has also become essential to integrate artificial-intelligence and big-data tools into economic policymaking, enabling crises to be anticipated before they occur and decisions to be taken more proactively.

Rwanda offers an African model worth studying in strengthening resilience through institutional reform and digital transformation. Since the turn of the millennium, the government has pursued a development vision focused on building effective institutions, improving the investment climate, expanding digital services, and developing human capital. World Bank data show that Rwanda achieved average growth of more than 7 per cent in many years over the past two decades, and became among the most attractive African destinations for investment thanks to streamlined administrative procedures, reliance on e-government, and an improved business environment. Financial inclusion rose markedly with the expansion of digital payments and mobile financial services, helping to bring broad segments of the population into formal economic activity.

The success of the Rwandan experience was not confined to macroeconomic indicators but extended to building institutional capacity to manage crises. The state invested in digital infrastructure, linked government services to electronic platforms, and strengthened information systems for health, education, taxation, and investment — accelerating the response to economic shocks and reducing transaction costs. It also gave growing attention to the green economy, expanding clean-energy projects, protecting natural resources, and encouraging sustainable investment, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals and international climate commitments.

The Rwandan experience is not without challenges, however. The economy still depends appreciably on external financing and international aid, while the small size of the domestic market makes it necessary to deepen economic integration with the rest of East Africa. The Rwandan model should therefore not be read as fully replicable, but as an experience confirming that institutional reform, digital transformation, and investment in human capital are foundational pillars of economic resilience — even in resource-constrained states.

In sum, reducing economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be achieved through fiscal or monetary policy in isolation. It requires a comprehensive development approach that links social protection, food security, job creation, support for small enterprises, deeper African economic integration, accelerated digital transformation, and investment in the green economy — alongside building institutions capable of managing risk and responding to shocks. The greater a state’s ability to adapt to crises and to reinforce citizens’ confidence in their economic future, the more economic anxiety recedes as a marker of fragility and turns instead into a driving force toward more sustainable and inclusive development.

Conclusion: Future Outlook and Recommendations

This study finds that economic anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer a phenomenon tied to falling incomes or rising poverty alone; it has become a composite indicator reflecting the fragility of economic and social structures in the face of successive crises. It confirms that persistent inflationary pressure, high food and energy prices, mounting debt burdens, weak labour markets, and growing climate and geopolitical risks have together deepened the sense of economic uncertainty among individuals — with damaging effects on social stability, trust in institutions, and the prospects for sustainable development. Addressing economic anxiety therefore requires a shift from short-term policies to a comprehensive development vision aimed at building more resilient economies, strengthening the capacity to withstand shocks, and entrenching economic security as one of the foundational pillars of stability and development on the continent.

Key Findings

◆  Economic anxiety is a multidimensional phenomenon that goes beyond the conventional concept of poverty, tied to individuals’ perception of economic security and their uncertainty about the future.

◆  Inflation, rising living costs, public debt, and supply-chain disruption have driven up levels of economic anxiety across many Sub-Saharan states.

◆  Declining food security and higher food and fertiliser prices have revealed the close link between economic crises and a deepening sense of economic fragility.

◆  Unemployment — particularly among the young — an expanding informal economy, and skilled emigration are among the foremost drivers of rising economic anxiety.

◆  Economic anxiety has clear repercussions for political and social stability, through declining institutional trust, rising protest, and higher rates of migration and crime in some states.

◆  Women, young people, rural populations, and low-income groups are the most exposed to the effects of economic anxiety, given the fragility of their economic and social circumstances.

◆  The case studies show that differing national contexts do not preclude shared patterns — the impact of economic reforms, global crises, and climate change in deepening the sense of economic instability.

◆  Successful experiences demonstrate that investment in social protection, digital transformation, an improved investment climate, and stronger economic integration raises economies’ capacity to withstand crises.

◆  Strengthening economic security has become a precondition for achieving sustainable development, reducing poverty, improving quality of life, and reinforcing political and social stability across the continent.

Strategic Recommendations

◆  Build integrated national and regional strategies to strengthen economic security and reduce economic anxiety, grounded in economic stability, improved living standards, and the capacity to withstand shocks.

◆  Strengthen food and energy security by diversifying import sources, increasing domestic production, developing agricultural value chains, and establishing strategic reserves of essential goods.

◆  Accelerate the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area and remove barriers to intra-African trade, so as to deepen economic integration and reduce dependence on external markets.

◆  Expand social protection and direct it to the groups most exposed to economic fragility — particularly young people, women, rural populations, and informal-sector workers.

◆  Adopt economic policies focused on creating sustainable jobs, supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, encouraging entrepreneurship, and advancing the digital and green economies.

◆  Strengthen the resilience of national economies by diversifying the productive base, reducing dependence on raw-material exports, and developing domestic and regional supply chains.

◆  Deploy artificial intelligence and big-data analytics to monitor indicators of economic anxiety, anticipate economic risks and crises, and support evidence-based decision-making.

◆  Strengthen economic governance, transparency, and accountability, and combat corruption, so as to improve the management of public resources and reinforce the confidence of citizens and investors in institutions.

◆  Invest in human capital by developing education systems, expanding vocational training, and building the digital and future-oriented skills that labour markets require.

◆  Establish an African Observatory for Economic Anxiety to measure the economic, social, and psychological indicators associated with the phenomenon, issue periodic reports, and provide early-warning systems to support policymakers.

◆  Strengthen cooperation between governments, the private sector, and regional and international institutions to coordinate economic policy, exchange expertise, and mount collective responses to cross-border crises.

◆  Adopt a comprehensive, sustainable development model that balances growth, social justice, and economic security — reinforcing societies’ capacity to withstand future crises and ensuring more inclusive and sustainable development.